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Abstract
This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic
growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction be-
tween policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes
political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive
market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of
the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth,
lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when com-
pared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium
considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may im-
prove welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by
means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new
paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic
performance.
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1 Introduction
It is a well acknowledged fact in the literature that most rent-seeking activi-
ties have baneful implications, not only over economic growth, but also over
welfare.1 In the pursue of profits, most firms undertake a variety of actions,
such as lobbying, tax evasion, litigation, corruption, or even theft, which are
individually profitable, but completely wasteful from the society’s perspec-
tive. Described by Boumol (1990) as “unproductive entrepreneurship,” since
they have the knack of reducing the set of resources applied on the real side
of the economy, cutting down production and slowing down growth, these
activities are usually brought into economic models through an exogenous
technology which transforms real resources in profitable activities for firms
while adding no productive return to the society.
However, we believe that such perspective may provide an inaccurate
analysis of the rent-seeking phenomenon, specially because it often ignores
agents’ interplay in determining the aggregate behavior of the economy, tak-
ing the loss of real resources that could have been used in productive activi-
ties as given. Understanding the forces that drive economic decisions and the
interaction between players, as well as the general equilibrium repercussions
of such actions, which may be specific to the type of activity, is essential to
depict the true effects of rent-seeking over economic growth, and primarily
welfare.2
This paper seeks to bring these considerations into analysis, in one very
specific form of rent-seeking: lobbying. More specifically, we are interested
in answering questions like: what determines political contributions and
how do policy-makers react to cash transfers from lobbyist firms, what are
the consequences of lobbying over market concentration and overall prof-
itability of firms and how do firms respond to these changing conditions,
namely in which concerns R&D expenditures, what are the general equilib-
rium repercussions of lobbying and how do all these changes in the economic
environment affect economic growth, and most importantly welfare. In this
sense, although our main focus is positive, we are ultimately concerned with
a normative analysis of lobbying, namely those activities which take the
form of political contributions, either in cash or in kind.
The relevance of lobbying
Lobbying has become a multi-billion dollar industry in the U.S.. Every year,
special interest groups – corporations, industry groups, labor unions, and
1Classical works on the effects of rent-seeking on economic performance include Krueger
(1974) and Bhagwati (1982).
2In fact, rent-seeking, can take many forms, and not all of them can accurately be
connected to lower economic performances. For instance, Bardhan (1997) cites some
historical examples where rent-seeking is thought to have promoted growth.
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Figure 1: Total expenditures in lobbying and campaign contributions by special interests.
Since federal campaigns are concentrated every two years, data on campaign contributions
concern all expenditures undertaken from special interests on the two years prior to the
elections. This data was collected from the Center for Responsive Politics.
single-issue organizations – spend billions of dollars to lobby the Congress
and federal agencies, in an attempt induce policy-makers in power to pay
attention to their issues and influence decision-making. Some of these special
interests retain lobbying firms, others even have lobbyists working in-house.
In addition, billions of dollars are also spend by these special interests in
campaign contributions every two years, when federal campaigns are held
and elections to the Congress take place. They do not do so lightheartedly,
however – contributors expect that money transfers incurred during political
campaigns are repaid back latter by the beneficiaries, in the form of favorable
legislation, less stringent regulations, political appointments, government
contracts or tax credits, just to name a few.3 In fact, the costs incurred by
special interest groups in lobbying and campaign contributions are a small
drop in the ocean as compared to the benefits they can reap if their efforts
are successful. Figure 1 reports the magnitudes implicated in lobbying since
data was made available by the Center of Responsive Politics.4 Although
subject to a tighter regulation, lobbying in the E.U. has also become a
reality, specially since late 1970’s. Nowadays, there exist more than 15,000
lobbyist in Brussels, representing the most various interests, all of them
seeking influence in the EU’s legislative process.
It is precisely the policy actions resulting from successful lobbying that,
3American political campaigns are, nowadays, analyzed in a much wider context than
simple cash transfer from special interest groups to political agents with the objective of
affecting the perspective voters have about candidates. For example, in a recent paper,
Grossmann (2009) observe the political campaigning in the U.S. as an industry itself, with
potential repercussions over American political competition.
4This data, as well as a more exhaustive explanation of the lobbying framework in the
U.S., is available in the following address: http://www.opensecrets.org.
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we argue, the literature has taken lightly, by ignoring the individual reac-
tions of economic agents to such change in the course of action – a black-box
perspective. Decision-makers, by changing policy and the economic environ-
ment faced by special interest groups, can motivate changes in individual
behavior, which, in turn, may be endowed with extra repercussions at the
macroeconomic level. It is our objective in this paper to dig in the source
of special interest politics, which will hopefully shed some light over the
specifics of political interaction, through a build in understanding of both
partial and general equilibrium relationships and consequent repercussions
on market structure, growth and welfare, as a result of lobbying. In par-
ticular, we observe that lobbying, by determining the market structure and
the profitability of firms, has critical implications not only over households
income, but also over productive decisions undertaken by firms, inclusively
expanding aggregate demand in the general equilibrium. The resulting in-
teraction between market structure, growth and welfare is complex, and the
final outcome depends on several economic effects that may predominate in
equilibrium. Ultimately, lobbying activities might even improve welfare over
a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium.
The model: an overview
In order to focus on our objective, we borrow the general equilibrium frame-
work from Peretto (1996, 1998), and consider an oligopolistic market with an
endogenous number of firms, each of whom producing a differentiated good
and undertaking in house R&D that generates higher quality products.5 In
the economic market, these firms compete among themselves for market
share, using prices and quality improvements to try to overcome their rivals
in the quest of larger profits. However, these firms also participate in other
more obscure market – the political market. In order to accurately capture
the mechanics behind political decision-making, we follow the classical con-
tributions on electoral competition and special interest politics by Grossman
and Helpman (1996); Baron (1994) and Austen-Smith (1987), and consider
an office motivated policy-maker, who realizes that, in order to win elections,
both votes and money are needed. Therefore, we assume that he maximizes
5As acknowledged by Brou and Ruta (2007), whose paper is in the same spirit as ours,
the number of active firms plays an extremely important role in determining the rate of
innovation, suggesting that any theory which relates rent-seeking to growth is not complete
without taking into account the interactions between market structure and R&D.
To our knowledge, the link between market structure and R&D dates back to Schumpeter
(1942). Applications to economic growth, however, are more recent. Peretto (1996) is
the first to explore the linkage between market structure and innovation in the growth
context.
Aghion et al. (2005) provide an alternative model which also explores the inverted-U
relationship between competition and innovation; however, their model lacks some relevant
features to our analysis.
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a weighted sum of welfare and political contributions, selecting the active
number of firms in the market which best serves his interests.
We motivate this approach in two ways. In the first, the legislator or
policy-maker affects directly the level of competition, by imposing an up-
ward limit on the number of licenses granted.6 Hence, any given firm who
seeks in R&D a way to overcome its rivals is compelled to make cash trans-
fers to the decision-maker; otherwise it faces the risk of being left behind
its competitors who have decided to present the bureaucrat with a share of
their profits. By shaping regulations, policy-makers are able to determine
the total profitability of the market, influencing the total amount of con-
tributions they receive. Obviously, we can re-interpret this scenario in a
more drastic way, raising the discussion to the corruption field, where the
government grants R&D licences in exchange for bribes. This last argument
follows Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who suggest that government officials are
monopolists over a type of good, in our case R&D licences, without which
the private sector cannot pursue their own economic activity, and exert their
monopoly power by demanding bribes from private agents in exchange for
those licences.7 A direct application of these arguments to economic growth
can be found in Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007), who consider that
firms must acquire permits from corrupt public officials in order to pursue
their private, growth enhancing, activities.
In the second interpretation, firms compete freely in the economic mar-
ket, but decide to overcome their rivalry and form a lobby who represents
their interests in the political market, in order to gain the necessary political
influence that allows them to shape public policy in their favor. This per-
spective is advocated by some studies (e.g. Barnett, 2006; Mizruchi, 1989;
Schuler et al., 2002), which point out that firms may benefit from collec-
tive action by presenting a unified voice, and strengthened by the results
in Ozer and Lee (2009), who found no support for preference for individ-
ual action to collective action from firms with higher R&D intensities. The
main objective of this organization is to use the political market to attain
what cannot be attained in the economic market, due to anti-trust regula-
tions - the maximization of the joint profit of its members. According to
this perspective, politics is simply a more obscure, yet legal, way to obtain
6This policy does not need to be seen as a direct action undertaken by the policy-
maker. There are many variables the government can influence, and most of them are not
directly perceived as a consequence of lobbying or political contributions. For instance,
the government can influence patent length, width, or even punishments when a patent
is violated. All these regulations influence market profitability, and consequently interact
with future contributions by the incumbent firms in the market.
7There is also a vast literature (see, for instance, Ades and Tella, 1999) emphasizing
the relationship between market structure and corruption; and in particular, Bliss and
Tella (1997) observe that bureaucrats can directly limit the level of competition within
the market in order to extract large levels of surplus, by creating regulations that limit
the entry of new firms.
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some type of collusive outcome, which appeals to the thirst of candidates for
political contributions. Policy-makers restrict the number of R&D licences
available to firms, in order to create profitability conditions that can be par-
tially appropriated in equilibrium.8 For the sake of objectiveness, we adopt
the second of these interpretations and consider that the policy-maker and
the lobby bargain over the number of R&D licences (or the number of active
firms), making a case of “licences for sale.”9
Our results: an overview
In the partial, or industry, equilibrium, we find that, if policy-makers regard
contributions as “sufficiently important,” lobbying induces a decrease in the
number of active firms in the market as compared to the laissez-faire, or
free-entry, equilibrium. Despite this policy being growth enhancing, since
the larger amount of profits to be disputed among firms makes R&D activi-
ties globally more attractive, the impact over welfare is negative, since this
growth effect is dominated by the increase in the markup and the reduc-
tion in the number of varieties. However, lobbying has also repercussions
in the general equilibrium. As firms adapt their decisions in response to a
more concentrated market, a disequilibrium in the labor market, character-
ized by an excess labor supply, arises, requiring a downward adjustment in
the wage rate as compared to the size of aggregate demand. To put dif-
ferently, lobbying, by creating profitability conditions in the market that
free-entry would have otherwise eliminated, has generated an extra source
of income for households – dividends –, therefore increasing the size of ag-
gregate demand in terms of the wage rate. This adjustment also reinforces
the partial equilibrium effect – since gross-profits have increased, contribu-
tions have become more attractive to the policy-maker, and the expansion
in aggregate demand refrains the welfare effects of a further increase in
market concentration. Hence, when compared to the free-entry status-quo,
the new steady-state with lobbying comprises a simultaneous adjustment
of the active number of firms and aggregate demand, with opposing effects
over aggregate welfare. While the increase in market concentration leads to
higher prices and a reduction in the number of varieties, which overcome the
increase in the growth rate, given aggregate demand, the expansion in ag-
gregate demand does not only allow households to adquire a more valuable
consumption basket, but also entails a further growth effect, leading firms
to increase their R&D efforts in an attempt to steal more business, now
8In addition, several empirical studies have shown that firms presenting higher R&D
intensities invest more in political action – see Hart (2003); Alt et al. (1999) and Taylor
(1997).
9This last expression is inspired in Grossman and Helpman (1994), who have used the
expression “protection for sale” to illustrate how politicians are willing to grant trade
protection for domestic firms in exchange for campaign contributions.
5
more valuable, to their competitors. Based on these interactions, we con-
clude that, even if the free-entry equilibrium is welfare maximizing, given
the general equilibrium conditions, lobbying can dictate an improvement
in aggregate welfare, through repercussions in aggregate demand which are
materialized in the general equilibrium and can offset the negative effects
inherent to a fall in the number of firms.
We also show that our economy with lobbying may be endowed with
some complex issues, not present when firms are allowed to freely enter and
exit the market. In particular, an equilibrium with lobbying may not exist,
specially if decision-makers are too eager for political contributions, situation
in which labor market clearing may not be attained for any wage rate. If an
equilibrium exists, it may also not be unique, since labor demand does not
need to be strictly decreasing in the wage rate, nor even continuous. Finally,
we note that the relationship between the preference factor for political
contributions and equilibrium welfare may be non-linear, which raises the
possibility that moderate levels of lobbying may have beneficial effects over
aggregate welfare, but excess lobbying may become highly prejudicial for
the society’s wellbeing.
Finally, we calibrate the model and illustrate how lobbying may influ-
ence the long-run performance and welfare of the U.S. economy. For our
benchmark calibration, the model predicts that lobbying may have resulted
in a long-run growth rate about .4 percentage points higher than the one
that would prevail under free-entry, with a positive repercussion in aggre-
gate welfare. We critically evaluate one of the main simplifying assumptions
of the model, which is crucial to determine the welfare change, and nu-
merically adapt the model to contemplate an alternative, more realistic,
approach. Under this modified scenario, we conclude that welfare might
have increased as a result of lobbying, but an increase in the intensity of
lobbying may result in prejudicial effects for the society.
Related literature
Our work is related to a growing literature that discusses the effects of rent-
seeking on economic performance, including Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996);
Parent and Prescott (1994) and Murphy et al. (1991).10 In particular, An-
geletos and Kollintzas (2000) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) an-
alyze the effects of rent-seeking on economic growth, but impose a constant
market structure, and rely on the standard rent-seeking technology (black-
box approach) to model the interaction between economic agents. Brou and
Ruta (2007) introduce an endogenous market structure, but their results
depend on a rent-seeking technology modeled in the wrong direction, i.e.,
where firms lobby the government in exchange for contributions, which are
10Other interesting references include Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005); Murphy et al.
(1993) and Olson (1982).
6
financed by taxing consumers. This structure makes unclear what they are
trying to explain. Since the government is a key agent in their framework,
lobbying would be a good candidate, however it is difficult to come up with
examples where the government itself taxes consumers in order to provide
firms with contributions, in exchange for lobbying activities which source
cannot be identified by any means. Besides, the government in their model
is nothing more than a mechanical being, who allocates money to firms
through an exogenous command which translates their rent-seeking efforts.
It is our opinion that such a model completely neglects the sources driving
economic performance, as agents’ interplay is a key factor in understanding
and developing such analysis.
It is our objective to cover this gap in the literature, presenting a model
where market structure is considered a key factor in economic analysis, and
where the interaction between players is explicitly taken into account. We
shall therefore proceed our analysis as follows. The next section presents the
benchmark model. Section 3 presents the free-entry laissez-faire equilibrium
– our benchmark case. Section 4 introduces lobbying and presents the main
results of the paper. In section 5 we undertake a calibration exercise. Section
6 concludes.
2 Benchmark model
2.1 Characterization
The model is set in continuous time. We take the (closed) economy to
be populated by a mass of L infinitely-lived and identical consumers; each
of whom supplies inelastically one unit of labor and seeks to maximize the
present value of the logarithm of consumption. Besides consumers, the econ-
omy is composed by N > 1 oligopolistic firms;11 each of whom supplies one
differentiated good using the available technology, and invests in Research
and Development (R&D) in order to improve its state-of-the-art product.12
11In the main analysis, we consider the number of firms, N , as a discrete variable, since
our results below rely on strategic interaction between firms. However, in some steps N
will be treated as a continuous variable, since this greatly simplifies the algebra of the
model.
12Contrary to Peretto (1996, 1998) and Brou and Ruta (2007), who consider cost-
reducing technological progress, here we assume that firms invest in quality improvements
over their state-of-the art product. These two specification are, however, formally equiv-
alent (Spence, 1984; Tirole, 1988), so that rewriting the model in terms of cost-reducing
technological progress yields exactly the same results.
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2.1.1 The demand side: consumer behavior
The typical household seeks to maximize lifetime utility13
u(t) =
∫ ∞
t
log
(
C(τ)
)
· e−ρ(τ−t)dτ
subject to the usual intertemporal budget constraint
∫ ∞
t
E(τ) · e−R(τ)dτ ≤
∫ ∞
t
[
w(τ) +D(τ) + T (τ)
]
· e−R(τ)dτ +A(t)
Here, ρ > 0 denotes the discount factor and R(τ) =
∫ τ
t r(s)ds is the average
interest rate from time 0 to time τ . The terms D and A represent per capita
dividends and assets, respectively, while w stands for the wage rate. The
term T designates per capita lump-sum transfers from the policy-maker.14
Finally, E denotes per capita expenditure and C stands for consumption.
Let PC denote the price index of consumption, with the following property
E = PC · C (1)
Using (1), the intertemporal maximization problem can be readily solved,
yielding the usual first-order condition
Ė
E
= r − ρ (2)
Consumers aggregate intermediate goods, xi, characterized by the state-of-
the-art quality index, qi, in a consumption bundle according to the Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) specification15
C =
[ N∑
i=1
(
qi · xi
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
(3)
where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two different varieties.
Note that expenditures can alternatively be written as
E =
N∑
i=1
pi · xi (4)
13A logarithmic specification allows us to keep the model more tractable, without bring-
ing any substantial qualitative changes to the results discussed in the paper, if compared
to the more general case of a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
14This term will only be relevant in the political market, and therefore its role is de-
scribed in greater detail therein.
15We are implicitly assuming that new goods render the obsolete versions useless, so
that households only obtain utility from the state-of-the-art product.
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Given the time path of expenditures in (2), the individual demand sched-
ules can be found by maximizing (3), pre-multiplied by the price index PC ,
subject to (4), yielding: xD(pi, qi) = ES(pi, qi)/pi, where the new term,16
S(pi, qi) =
p
−(ε−1)
i q
(ε−1)
i∑N
j=1 p
−(ε−1)
j q
(ε−1)
j
represents the market share captured by firm i. As consumers are identical,
the demand faced by each firm is
XD(pi, qi) =
LES(pi, qi)
pi
(5)
For later reference, let us keep in mind that the price elasticity of demand
is
ξ(pi, qi) = −
dXDi
dpi
pi
XDi
= ε− (ε− 1)S(pi, qi) (6)
and the quality elasticity of demand can be described as
ζ(pi, qi) =
dXDi
dqi
qi
XDi
= (ε− 1)
(
1− S(pi, qi)
)
(7)
2.1.2 The supply side: technology
Each firm produces output with technology
LXi = Xi + φ (8)
where Xi is the total output produced by firm i and LXi is labor used in
production. The parameter φ > 0 is a fixed and sunk cost of production,
which can be interpreted as the labor required to keep the firm running.
The firm’s quality stock, qi, which determines the quality embedded in
the state-of-the-art product, is directly related to the firm’s knowledge, zi.
To be more specifically, we consider that a level of knowledge of zi units
generates a quality index of
qi = zθi
where θ is the elasticity of quality with respect to R&D investment. The
parameter zi evolves according to
16From this problem, we can also obtain the price index of consumption
Pc =
( N∑
i=1
p
(1−ε)
i q
−(1−ε)
i
) 1
1−ε
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żi = Lzi ·
[
zi + γ
N∑
j 6=i
zj
]
= Lzi · Zi (9)
where żi is the number of new patents produced in dτ units of time by a
firm employing Lzi units of labor in R&D. The specification in (9) considers
that the productivity in the R&D sector is a linear combination of both pri-
vate and public knowledge, with γ ∈ (0, 1) determining the share of private
research that becomes publicly available. To make an analogy with some
traditional literature on quality-ladder models,17 we can think that, when an
innovator brings a new product into the market, researchers can costlessly
disassemble and study all its attributes, and this knowledge can be readily
used by firms to develop new blueprints, increasing the productivity of R&D
by γ.
The term Zi =
(
zi + γ
∑N
j 6=i zj
)
is introduced to shorten notation, and
represents total productivity of a firm investing Lzi units of labor in R&D.
Finally, notice that the technology in (9) exhibits overall increasing returns
to scale and constant returns to scale in knowledge.18
2.1.3 Defining industry equilibrium
Since lobbying plays a crucial role in determining the equilibrium number of
firms and consequently equilibrium growth and welfare, we need to establish
the concept of equilibrium both under laissez-faire and with lobbying. Our
analysis here will be restricted to a symmetric equilibrium, since this makes
the model more tractable and conveys the main intuition more clearly as
compared to the asymmetric case. Hence, we assume, as in Peretto (1996),
that knowledge diffuses across firms as workers move from one firm to the
other. Since incumbent firms accumulate knowledge at equal rates, all work-
ers have the same level of expertise, and therefore new entrants are able to
acquire this knowledge by hiring workers from existing firms. Alternatively,
we can think that entrants are able to learn costlessly all the characteristics
of any existing good and do not need any additional effort to set up their
R&D at the average quality of the market. Finally, a normalization is needed
in order to setup the roots of the model, and therefore we fix qi(t) = 1, ∀ i.
Let us first consider the definition of industry equilibrium under laissez-
faire, i.e., where the government has no influence over the market structure.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that firms can enter and exit the market
costlessly. Individual optimization requires that firms maximize their stock
market value, Vi, through the choice of a pricing strategy, pi, and a R&D
strategy, Lzi , taking as given the number of competitors and the price of
labor. Once this behavior is established, entry and exit decisions based on
17See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991).
18See Peretto (1996) for a brief discussion on this technology.
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individual profitability conditions within the market determine the number
of active firms.
More formally, let si = [pi(τ), Lzi(τ)] , τ ≥ t be the strategy vector
played by firm i, and define s = [s1, . . . , sN ]. Then,
Definition 1. The vector [s, N ] is an instantaneous equilibrium with free-
entry and exit (no lobbying) if for all i:
Vi(si, s−i, N) ≥ Vi(s′i, s−i, N)
and, for all N > 1,
Vi(si, s−i, N) ≥ 0 ≥ Vi(si, s−i, N + 1)
The first of these conditions implies precisely that the behavior of firms is
optimal, i.e., profit maximizing, given the market structure and the strategy
vectors of all other firms. The second condition establishes that entry/exit
from the market is driven by profitability conditions that arise within it.
Once lobbying is taken into account, politicians may influence the deter-
minants of market structure, ultimately defining the number of active firms
in the economy. The policy-maker sets the number of firms, N , so as to
maximize his objective function, which is a weighted average of the repre-
sentative consumer’s welfare, U(N), and the total amount of contributions,
Ω(N), with a weight of λ placed on the latter.19 More formally, we have
Definition 2. The vector [s, N ] is an instantaneous equilibrium with lobby-
ing if for all i:
Vi(si, s−i, N) ≥ Vi(s′i, s−i, N)
and, for all N,N ′ > 1,
(1− λ) · U(N) + λ · Ω(N) ≥ (1− λ) · U(N ′) + λ · Ω(N ′)
where,
N,N ′ ∈ {x ∈ N : Vi(si, s−i, x) ≥ 0 ∀i}
The first condition is the same as for the case with no lobbying. The
second and third conditions state that the policy-maker chooses a market
structure among all feasible alternatives (which imply no economic loss for
firms), in order to satisfy his objective function.20
19In our setup, as all individuals are identical, the utility of the representative individual
can be thought of as the utility of the median voter.
20According to this definition, even a benevolent politician with λ = 0 may want to
induce a change in the market structure, selecting a lower number of firms than determined
by the zero-profit condition. The reason is that the utility of the representative individual,
U(N), does not need to be increasing in its argument, and hence higher welfare may be
attained through a reduction in the number of firms. We return to this issue later.
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This formulation is common in the literature, and intends to capture
the intuition that both popular policies and money are needed to win elec-
tions. Austen-Smith (1987), for example, argue that policy-makers may be
willing to move away from the preferred policy-vector by voters in order to
increase campaign contributions, as these can be used to influence voters
perceptions about candidates’ positions (either through media and political
debates, or by increasing the collection of information), therefore shaping
the electoral outcome. Grossman and Helpman (1996) use a model of elec-
toral competition and distinguish between informed voters, who are able
to understand and evaluate parties programmes and characteristics, and
uninformed or impressionable voters, who are not able to evaluate parties
positions and therefore are highly responsive to campaign spending. In this
context, they show that the above specification captures quite well politi-
cal decision-making when candidates seek to maximize the fraction of total
votes in the legislature.21
In our model, if the weight given to contributions, λ, is sufficiently high,
then a more restrictive market structure can create profitability conditions
that free-entry would otherwise eliminate, possibly inducing an equilibrium
with positive contributions to the government and positive profits for the
firms.
2.2 The economic market
In this subsection, we analyze the economic decisions of firms, as well as the
growth rate and welfare, for a given market structure.
2.2.1 The firm’s problem
Firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively maximize the net present value
of cash flows,
Vi(t) =
∫ ∞
t
πi(τ) · e−R(τ)dτ, (10)
where instantaneous profits are
πi = pi ·XD(pi, qi)− w · (LXi + Lzi),
through the choice of a price strategy and R&D expenditure, subject to
the technological constraints (8) and (9), and total demand (5), taking as
given the number of firms, and the competitors’ pricing strategies and R&D
investments. The Current Value Hamiltonian is
21More recently, Rodŕıguez (2004) used a similar structure to model a bargain between
capitalists and the government, which leads to a negative relationship between redistribu-
tion and inequality.
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Hcvi = (pi − w) ·
LESi
pi
− w · (Lzi + φ) + µi · Lzi
[
zi + γ
N∑
j 6=i
zj
]
,
where the co-state variable, µi, measures the value of a marginal unit of
knowledge, i.e., the value of the patent. The firm’s knowledge capital, zi,
is the state variable, and R&D investment, Lzi , and the price, pi, are the
control variables. As this economy lacks a monetary unit, we take the wage
rate as numeraire and measure all variables in terms of w. Without loss of
generality, consider that w = 1 henceforth.
As the decision regarding the price level is not associated to any dy-
namic constraint, it follows immediately that the optimal Nash-Bertrand
price strategy is
pi =
ξi
ξi − 1
(11)
where ξi is the price elasticity of demand defined in (6). The optimal R&D
strategy implies that the marginal revenue from one unit of R&D matches
its marginal cost, i.e.22
1 = µi ·
[
zi + γ
N∑
j 6=i
zj
]
= µi · Zi (12)
The differential equation in the co-state variable yields the no-arbitrage
condition
r = θ
pi − 1
pi
· LESi
zi
· ζi
µi
+ Lzi +
µ̇i
µi
, (13)
where ζi is the quality elasticity of demand in (7). Equation (13) states that
the rate of return of a riskless asset equals the return of the R&D project
undertaken by the firm. Using the price strategy (11) and condition (12),
this simplifies to
r = θ · LE · Si ·
ζi
ξi
· Zi
zi
+ Lzi +
µ̇i
µi
(14)
Finally, we close this section by presenting the transversality condition,
lim
τ→∞
µi(τ) · zi(τ) · e−R(τ) = 0
which states that, at the end of the planning horizon, the firm’s knowledge
has no value.
22Throughout the analysis, we implicitly assume that this problem yields an interior
solution, i.e. Lzi > 0. We do not deal directly with situations where this condition is
violated.
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2.2.2 The symmetry property
In this paper we focus on the symmetric equilibrium. Let the variables
without subscripts represent industry averages. Then, the quality stock
evolves over time according to
q̇
q
= θ · ż
z
= θ · σ(N) · Lz, (15)
where the new term σ(N) = [1 + γ(N − 1)] represents the productivity of
a R&D project applying one unit of labor. Note that σ(N) is increasing in
N , reflecting the positive impact of publicly available knowledge on R&D
productivity. Following our previous notation, Z = σ(N) · z, and hence we
have23
Ż
Z
=
ż
z
(16)
Differentiating equation (12) with respect to time, using conditions (15) and
(16), and the facts Z/z = σ(N) and S = 1/N in a symmetric equilibrium,
the no-arbitrage condition (14) reduces to24
r =
LE
Nξ
· θζ · [1 + γ(N − 1)]− γ · (N − 1) · Lz (17)
where the price and quality elasticities of demand are respectively,
ξ = ε− (ε− 1) 1
N
and ζ = (ε− 1)N − 1
N
Equation (17) allows us to identify the determinants driving average R&D
investment, and consequently economic growth. The term LENξ represents the
gross-profit effect, and is simply the gross profit of the firm for a given market
share. The term θζ is the business-stealing effect, and captures the increase
in market share due to quality increasing R&D.25 Spillovers also have two
distinct effects over R&D productivity, working on opposite directions. On
one hand, firms realize that their own R&D will generate spillovers, which
will make their competitors more productive. This is captured by the term
−γ · (N − 1). On the other hand, firms also benefit from the spillovers of
23Without lobbying, the free-entry condition determines the number of firms at each
moment in time. Profitability conditions inside the market are instantaneously eliminated
by costless entry/exit, implying Ṅ = 0 at all times. With lobbying, the active number
of firms responds immediately to the number of R&D licences made available by the
policy-maker, so that Ṅ = 0 at all times.
24In order to avoid some cumbersome notation, we emphasize the dependence of N in
some variables only when it is relevant for the analysis or discussion.
25This terminology is based on Peretto (1996, 1998). A more detailed discussion about
these effects can be found here.
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other firms, which contribute positively to their productivity, by the amount
γ(N − 1).
Observe that equation (17) can be rewritten as
Lz(N,E, r) =
1
γ
[
θζ(N) · LE
Nξ(N)
· σ(N)
(N − 1)
− r
N − 1
]
(18)
delivering the optimal individual investment in R&D as a function the num-
ber of firms, N , aggregate demand, LE, and the interest rate, r. Average
R&D in (18) is endowed with a very special property: it is hump-shaped in
the number of firms, N .26 The intuition is quite simple. While the gross-
profit effect implies that the returns to R&D are decreasing in N , since a
higher number of firms entails both a decrease in the market share and in
the markup, which are translated into lower profits and consequently lower
incentives to invest in quality upgrades, the business-stealing effect implies
that firms are willing to invest more as N increases, as the potential gain
in market share due to R&D becomes higher. The business-stealing effect
should dominate when there are few firms, as the total amount of market
profits that can be appropriated through R&D is higher, while the gross-
profit effect should predominate when N is large, because the amount of
profits that can be captured through quality improvements becomes lower.
Spillovers have a second order effect over Lz. When concentration is maxi-
mal, the business-stealing effect approaches zero, and no R&D is undertaken,
regardless of spillovers. On the other hand, in a monopolistically competi-
tive market, the positive and negative effect of spillovers tend to cancel each
other out, and the gross-profit effect defines the limiting behavior of average
R&D.
Aggregate R&D, Lz(N,E, r) = NLz(N,E, r) is also hump-shaped in
N , due to the dispersion effect. As the number of firms grows large, R&D
resources are being spread across too many firms; firms become unable to
exploit economies of scale in the R&D lab and push down their investments
in product development. As the reduction in average R&D eventually offsets
the increase in the number of R&D projects in the economy, Lz goes down.
Finally, in a symmetric equilibrium instantaneous profits reduce to
π(N,E, r) =
LE
Nξ(N)
− (Lz(N,E, r) + φ) (19)
2.3 Growth and welfare
2.3.1 Growth
The growth rate in this economy is determined by the growth rate of con-
sumption. Plugging in x = E · (ξ − 1)/(Nξ) in the consumption index (3),
26Although this is not true for all possible parameter values, intuitively this is the more
relevant situation to consider. In what follows, we confine ourselves to this case.
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taking the logarithm and simplifying, we obtain
logC(τ) =
1
ε− 1
logN + log
ξ(N)− 1
ξ(N)
+ log q(τ) + logE(τ) (20)
Differentiating the above equation with respect to time yields
g(N,E, r) = θ
1 + γ(N − 1)
N
· Lz(N,E, r) + r − ρ (21)
which gives us the growth rate as a function of the number of firms in
the market, N , aggregate expenditures, LE, and the interest rate, r. In
this economy, growth depends on how the average quality of all available
brands evolves through time and on the usual intertemporal trade-off faced
by consumers. Note the difference between these two sources of growth:
the former is based on quality improvements, which enable consumers to
appropriate larger benefits from existing products; the latter is just the
outcome of the intertemporal decision of consuming today versus delaying
consumption to some future date, and is not associated to any intrinsic
expansion of the consumption basket.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting the determinants of average quality
growth. The term 1 + γ(N − 1) captures the productivity of one unit of
labor in an R&D project undertaken by the average firm, and is composed
of two effects: the direct effect of the project on the quality of the product
developed by the firm, and the indirect effect of the project over the overall
stock of knowledge available to other firms, which enable them to become
more productive and increase the quality of their products faster. This latter
effect is increasing in N , since a higher number of firms allows the economy
to appropriate a larger amount of spillovers. The term Lz/N captures the
resources applied to improve the average brand of the economy. Since
(
1 +
γ(N − 1)
)
/N converges to a lower bound γ, the growth rate is also hump-
shaped in the number of firms.
For illustrative purposes, it will be useful later to represent the economy’s
growth rate as a function of the complement of the Lerner Index (hereinafter
l). Noting that the Lerner Index (l) is simply the inverse of the elasticity of
demand, i.e. l = ξ(N)−1, the relationship between the number of firms and
l can be expressed as N = ξ−1(1/l), or equivalently27
N =
(1− l)(ε− 1)
(1− l)ε− 1
(22)
27Observe that as N converges to infinity, l converges to the lower bound 1/ε. There is
always some market power, as the Lerner Index cannot fall below this value. Moreover,
we use the complement of the Lerner Index only because this measure depends positively
on the number of firms, which is convenient for the subsequent analysis. It follows that
all the properties of the economy derived as a function of N can immediately be also
described as a function of l, with no need of further adjustments.
16
Using this identity in (21), we obtain the relationship between growth and a
convenient measure of market concentration, g(l, E, r), as illustrated in ap-
pendix A.1. We will often use this relationship without explicitly mentioning
it to go from the Lerner Index to the number of firms and vice-versa.
2.3.2 Welfare
The lifetime utility of the representative individual as a function of N and
the general equilibrium variables E and r is
U(N,E, r) =
1
ρ
[
1
ε− 1
logN + log
ξ(N)− 1
ξ(N)
+
g(N,E, r)
ρ
+ logE
]
(23)
which can also be expressed as a function of l, U(l, E, r), using identity
(22). Equation (23) captures three effects through which a decrease in mar-
ket concentration affects welfare.28 The first is a pure variety effect – a larger
number of varieties makes consumers better off, due to the enlargement in
the set of available options. The second is a competition effect, which cap-
tures the decrease in the markup price following a less concentrated market
structure. Finally, the growth rate determines the increase in the flow utility
over time. It follows that the utility above does not need to be positively
related to N . As the growth rate is hump-shaped in the number of firms,
an increase in the number of brands for large N may induce a reduction in
aggregate R&D capable of overcoming both the gains obtained through a
larger number of varieties and a lower price level.
In order to emphasize the true effects of political contributions over wel-
fare and growth in the general equilibrium framework, it is convenient to
assume that the utility function in (23) is strictly increasing in N , since this
will induce a laissez-faire equilibrium which is welfare maximizing. This
should not be seen as a restriction imposed upon the model; rather its main
role is to strengthen our argument, by illustrating how lobbying is able to in-
crease welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry (general) equilibrium.29
We therefore postulate the following:
Assumption. The utility function represented in equation (23) is increas-
ing in the number of varieties, N , for a given level of expenditures, E.
28In what follows, we use the terms utility and welfare interchangeably where it leads
to no confusion to refer to equation (23).
29This assumption captures Romer’s (1994) observation that the decrease in the number
of available varieties following exit from the market may have a determinant impact over
welfare. Our calibration results, presented in section 5, also suggest a positive relationship
between the number of firms and individual utility.
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3 Equilibrium with no lobbying: the benchmark
case
3.1 Industry equilibrium
In the absence of lobbying activities, and with entry and exit costs equal
to zero, the equilibrium number of firms is a jumping variable that satisfies
the free-entry condition at all time.30 In particular, whenever V > 0 there
is entry, whereas for V < 0 there is exit. Differentiating equation (10) with
respect to time an rearranging, we obtain the following perfect-foresight, no
arbitrage condition for the equilibrium in the capital market
rV = π + V̇
This equation, together with the free-entry condition, V = 0 ∀τ , implies that
instantaneous profits, π(N,E, r), must equal zero at all time.31 Making use
of (19), this can be summarized as
LE
Nξ(N)
= Lz(N,E, r) + φ (24)
which determines the number of firms in the market as a function aggregate
expenditures, LE, and the interest rate, r, and where Lz is given by (18).
Let the solution to (24) be denoted by Nf (E, r). Aggregate R&D, as a
function of the general equilibrium variables, simplifies to
Lz
(
Nf (E, r), E
)
=
LE
ξ
(
Nf (E, r)
) −Nf (E, r) · φ (25)
3.2 General equilibrium
In order to find the equilibrium growth rate, it remains to impose two gen-
eral equilibrium requirements – the first-order condition from consumers
intertemporal optimization problem, and the labor market clearing condi-
tion. Together, these enable us to recover per capita expenditures and the
interest rate. Observe that the labor market clearing condition implies
Nf (E, r) · LX
(
Nf (E, r), E
)
+ Lz
(
Nf (E, r), E
)
= L (26)
where Lz
(
Nf (E, r), E
)
is defined in (25) and
LX
(
N,E
)
= LE · ξ(N)− 1
Nξ(N)
+ φ (27)
30For analytical convenience, the rest of the analysis treats the number of firms as a
continuous variable. See Brou and Ruta (2007) and Peretto (1996) for a discussion on this
issue.
31Consequently, dividends in the consumers budget constraint must also be zero.
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After some algebra, (26) reduces to Ef = 1, and it follows that, in equi-
librium, Ė/E = 0. Finally, joining (18) with (24), using the expression for
ζ(N) and the facts that r = ρ and Ef = 1, we obtain the equilibrium num-
ber of firms under free-entry, denoted by Nf = Nf (Ef , ρ), as the solution
to32
L
Nfξ(Nf )
[
1− θ(ε− 1)σ(N
f )
γ ·Nf
]
+
ρ
γ · (Nf − 1)
= φ (28)
from which we can also obtain lf =
(
ξ(Nf )− 1
)
/ξ(Nf ).
3.3 Equilibrium growth and welfare
The equilibrium growth is obtained after replacing N , E and r in equation
(21) by their equilibrium values. Letting Lfz = Lz(Nf , Ef ), the equilibrium
growth rate in this economy under laissez-faire becomes
gf = θ · 1 + γ(N
f − 1)
Nf
· Lfz
Finally, welfare in equilibrium is
Uf =
1
ρ
[
1
ε− 1
logNf + log
ξ(Nf )− 1
ξ(Nf )
+
gf
ρ
]
In general, gf does not define the maximum growth rate, since an increase
in market concentration might be able to foster growth. However, the equi-
librium number of firms is clearly welfare maximizing, since it provides con-
sumers with the best mix of growth, prices and varieties, within the set
that allows firms to have non-negative profits, given the general equilibrium
conditions (refer to appendix A.2 for a graphical representation). From
here onwards, we only consider the case where the free-entry outcome is
associated to a market concentration which lies below the one required to
maximize the growth rate, so that a reduction in the number of firms, ceteris
paribus, always increases growth. This is the most realistic case to consider,
as we note in the calibration section later on.
32Equation (28) does not need to define a unique stable market structure; in fact, a
market equilibrium with positive levels of R&D may be sustained for more than one
value of Nf . In what follows, however, we abstain from these issues, which unnecessarily
complicate our analysis, and take the above equation to define a unique stable market
structure.
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4 Lobbying and the political market
4.1 Introducing lobbying
We now turn to the effects of lobbying over market structure, growth,
and welfare. Since the policy-maker is usually seen as a monopolist over
R&D licences, we assume, with no loss of generality, that he is able to de-
fine the market structure directly. This approach can be motivated in at
least two different ways. In the first, firms compete among themselves for
R&D licences, presenting politicians with cash transfers in order to influ-
ence decision-making in their favor. The policy-maker therefore chooses the
active number of firms, taking into account the total profitability of the
market, since this influences the level of contributions he is able to extract
in equilibrium. In the second, firms associate among themselves and create
a lobby, who presents politicians with in-kind or campaign contributions,
or any other form of political contributions, from its members, in exchange
for a more restrictive R&D policy which enhances the profitability of the
market. In this latter case, firms and politicians engage in a bargain over
a market structure and an amount of contributions that makes all players
(weakly) better off.33 In the model we develop, the former interpretation
can be seen as a special case of the latter, with a completely asymmetric
distribution of surplus in the benefit of the policy-maker. Hence, and again
with no loss of generality, throughout the remaining analysis we focus on
the second of these interpretations.34
Politicians are purely office motivated, but they realize that money can
be used to capture votes, either through propaganda or media debates, or
simply by signaling voters their ability to raise funds. We capture this behav-
ior through a widely used specification where the policy-maker maximizes
a weighted sum of society’s welfare and political contributions, as stated in
definition 2. These weights are a simple shortcut to represent more complex
scenarios as, for example, political transparency or the level of democracy
(Aghion et al., 2007), the number of uninformed voters who are highly re-
sponsive to campaign expenditures (Baron, 1994; Grossman and Helpman,
1996), or the number of swing voters who are highly responsive to changes
33Although this negotiation can induce exit from the market, the best alternative avail-
able to firms is the one conveyed by the free-entry outcome, which has the same economic
value as the former. Hence, lobbying can make no firm worse off.
Moreover, note that, since firms are owned by consumers, it is in fact consumers who ul-
timately lobby the government. An increase in concentration results in positive dividends
and transfers, which allows consumers to expand the amount of goods they can afford for
the same price level.
34We do not provide a theory of lobbying formation here. We simply assume that firms
are able to overcome their rivalry and get organized in order to improve their bargaining
power, ignoring any issues that might be induced by the possibility of free-riding. We can
think that firms not represented in the lobby cannot obtain licences from the policy-maker
or face larger difficulties in obtaining these licences, due to a lack of bargaining power.
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Figure 2: Venn diagram with the interaction between economic agents.
in platforms by political parties (Person and Tabellini, 2000).
We consider that the policy-maker distributes the proceeds from contri-
butions back to households through lump-sum transfers, represented by T
in the consumer’s budget constraint. Otherwise, the existence of equilib-
rium would require that agents would be able to run Ponzi schemes forever,
since expenditures would exceed income at all times.35 A way to think of
this assumption is that the policy-maker does not extract direct benefits
from political contributions, but only from holding office, and therefore he
redistributes them back to consumers in order to influence his prospects
of election. Figure 2 summarizes the interactions between agents in this
economy.
If we take the temporal horizon of politicians to be the same as the
remaining economic agents,36 and assume an identical discount factor, the
utility of the policy-maker is
upol(t) = (1− λ)
∫ ∞
t
log
(
C(τ)
)
· e−ρ(τ−t)dτ + λ
∫ ∞
t
Ψ(τ) · e−ρ(τ−t)dτ (29)
where Ψ(τ) ≥ 0 is the total amount of instantaneous contributions and C(τ)
is households consumption, at time τ . To keep the model tractable, in what
follows we only consider contribution schedules that are steady over time,
i.e., Ψ(τ) = Ψ. We will be more specific about Ψ latter on. The first part
of (29) is the utility of the representative individual given the number of
35The relevant point of this assumption is that political contributions must be spent on
goods produced in the economy. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the policy-
maker used the income from contributions to buy goods from firms. This, however, pro-
vides an additional complication in the model, without bringing any substantial insights
to our theoretical discussion. In the calibration section, we specifically discuss, in the
context, the role of this alternative specification, and analyze how it affects the results.
36If we think that parties present a significative role in defining the relevant policies,
then this assumption is not totally unrealistic. The market structure follows a continuous
negotiation through time between parties and lobbyist firms, which overcomes the shorter
temporal horizon of policy-makers.
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firms and the general equilibrium conditions, as defined in equation (23),
multiplied by the weight the policy-maker assigns to the welfare of voters,
relative to political contributions.
A reference case: the benevolent policy-maker
Let us consider first a benevolent policy-maker, who is solely concerned with
the utility of the representative individual (λ = 0). He solves
max
N
1
ρ
[
1
ε− 1
logN + log
ξ(N)− 1
ξ(N)
+
g(N,E, r)
ρ
+ logE
]
s.t.
LE
Nξ(N)
−
(
Lz(N,E, r) + φ
)
≥ 0
taking as given the general equilibrium variables of the economy, E and
r. Since U(N,E, r) is increasing in N , the free-entry condition determines
the equilibrium number of firms, as a function of aggregate expenditures
and the interest rate. Hence, a benevolent policy-maker does not interfere
with market forces, adopting a welfare maximizing laissez-faire policy. It
follows that all the analysis developed previously can be used to characterize
this economy. Crucially, note that, in the general equilibrium, growth is
potentially below the maximum rate.
4.2 Industry equilibrium with lobbying
4.2.1 A simple model of lobbying with collusive bargaining
For a given the market structure, firms behave exactly as depicted in section
3, but now they realize that the industry equilibrium is not defined by the
usual zero-profit condition. Instead, an equilibrium with positive profits can
be sustained, as an R&D licence issued by the policy-maker is required to
keep the firm running. The objective of this section is to present a simple
model of lobbying where firms and policy-makers bargain over the amount
of contributions and the number of R&D licences made available for firms
to pursue their own economic activities. This process defines the industry
equilibrium, given the general equilibrium variables E and r.
More specifically, our focus lies on an efficient bargain, which makes all
players (weakly) better off as compared to a status-quo market structure,
N s. An obvious candidate for N s is the equilibrium number of firms under
free-entry, Nf , but more generally it can represent any active number of
firms in the market prior to the bargain. Assume firms are able to get
organized in a lobby, whose objective is to maximize the joint surplus of
its members, and let Π(N,E, r) = N · π(N,E, r) denote aggregate profits,
where π is defined in (19). Then, the individual rationality constraints for
the policy-maker and the lobby are, respectively
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IRP : (1− λ) ·
[
U(N,E, r)− U(N s, E, r)
]
+ λ · Ψ
ρ
≥ 0
IRF :
Π(N,E, r)−Π(N s, E, r)
ρ
− Ψ
ρ
≥ 0
In order for both to be satisfied, we must have
Ψ ∈
[
1− λ
λ
· ρ [U(N s, E, r)− U(N,E, r)] ,Π(N,E, r)−Π(N s, E, r)
]
This condition states that a successful bargain, which results in an increase
in industry concentration, is only feasible if the policy-maker is largely con-
cerned with political contributions relative to social welfare. Namely, a
negotiation is feasible if and only if there exists a N ′ < N s such that37
λ
1− λ
> ρ · U(N
s, E, r)− U(N ′, E, r)
Π(N ′, E, r)−Π(N s, E, r)
(30)
Otherwise, the status-quo outcome is implemented. If we take N s = Nf ,
then the violation of condition (30) means that the policy-maker does not
interfere in the market, and the outcome is as depicted for the laissez-faire
equilibrium. The utility possibilities frontier is given by the solution to the
following problem
max
Ψ,N
(1− λ) ·
[
U(N,E, r)− U(N s, E, r)
]
+ λ · Ψ
ρ
s.t. Π(N,E, r)−Π(N s, E, r)−Ψ = Π
Π(N,E, r) ≥ 0
N > 1
which states that agents will negotiate a market structure such that each
surviving firm is left with a profit of Π/N > 0, after contributions have
been paid. Plugging in the first constraint into the objective function and
defining λ′ = λ(1 − λ)−1 as the relative weight of political contributions
to social welfare in the policy-maker’s utility function, the problem can be
restated as
max
N
U(N,E, r) +
λ′
ρ
·
[
Π(N,E, r)−Π
]
(31)
s.t. N ∈ [1, N s]
37Since our interest lies on cases where lobbying activities generate a decrease in the
active number of firms, we confine ourselves to situations where Ns > N ′.
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Note that problem (31) is the same as maximizing the utility of the policy-
maker represented in equation (29), after imposing the no growth condition
on contributions and plugging in the relevant restrictions. For future conve-
nience, let us redefine the utility of the politician as a function of the number
of firms, Upol(N,E, r), as being equivalent to the objective function of the
above problem.38
Observe that Upol(N,E, r) does not need to be strictly quasiconcave
in N , and in fact imposing such condition turns out to be a too strong
restriction on the model, mainly for the general equilibrium framework.
Therefore, although we can always find a global maximum, the first-order
condition that we provide below, alone, is not sufficient to characterize the
negotiated market structure between the lobby and the policy-maker. We
analyze the consequences of this issue in more detail later. Bearing these
considerations in mind, the first-order condition for an interior solution,
evaluated at the negotiated market structure, N̂p, is39
dU
dN
∣∣∣∣
N=N̂p
+
λ′
ρ
· dΠ
dN
∣∣∣∣
N=N̂p
= 0 (32)
where N̂p identifies the global maximum of problem (31)
Upol
(
N̂p, E, r
)
≥ Upol
(
N̂ , E, r
)
, ∀N̂ ∈ [1, N s] (33)
Equation (32) defines the negotiated market structure, N̂p = Np(λ,E, r)
(and the Lerner index) as a function of the general equilibrium conditions
and the political weight given to contributions. It states that the policy-
maker restricts the number of firms until the marginal sacrifice in individual
utility matches the marginal gain from contributions. To put differently, the
lobby undertakes political contributions in exchange for a more restrictive
market structure that enhances the profitability of firms, and politicians
effectively respond to these incentives, until the marginal benefit from ad-
ditional contributions matches the marginal sacrifice in terms of households
utility. Given E and r, both players walk out of the bargain better off, at
the expense of the inhabitants of the economy, despite the higher growth
rate motivated by the increase in the level of gross profits. We can therefore
put forward our first result:
Result 1. In the partial equilibrium (or sectorial equilibrium), when com-
pared to the perfect foresight laissez-faire general equilibrium, lobbying:
(i) increases market concentration;
38We eliminated U(Ns, E, r) and Π(Ns, E, r) from (31), since these terms are constants,
given E and r, and therefore they do not affect the first-order condition below.
39For large values of λ′, the left hand side may be strictly positive for all values of N ,
and the problem in (31) yields a corner solution at N = 1. On the other hand, low values
of λ′ imply N = Ns.
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(ii) raises the growth rate (except for values of λ sufficiently close to one);
(iii) reduces individual welfare.
This result is illustrated in figure 3. Starting from the perfect foresight
general equilibrium under laissez-faire, the introduction of lobbying is able
to foster growth, since a higher concentration increases the total amount
of gross profits in the market that can be disputed through quality based
R&D. However, consumers have a lower number of varieties available to
construct their consumption index and face a higher price level. These two
effects overcome the gains obtained from a higher growth rate, leading to a
decrease in individual utility.
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Figure 3: The effect of lobbying on growth and welfare in the partial equilibrium under
assumption IU (E = Ef ; r = ρ).
Note that the increase in the growth rate is only guaranteed for mod-
erate values of λ, since a large preference for political contributions by the
policy-maker generates an excessively concentrated market, in which there
are little or no incentives to invest in product innovation. In particular, a
fully voracious policy-maker (λ converges to one) implements a monopolis-
tic market structure. With a sole active firm in the market, there are no
incentives to innovate, and the growth rate comes down to zero.40
Note additionally that the “partial equilibrium” result can be interpreted
as a sectorial equilibrium, where lobbying activities undertaken by firms in
a given sector have lead to a higher concentration in that industry and to a
higher sectorial growth rate. Although the increase in market concentration
obviously affects decisions, inducing an excess supply of labor, the resulting
unemployment ends up being reflected only marginally throughout the re-
maining sectors of the economy, in which lobbying is not considered an issue.
Hence, adjustments at the global level are negligible and result 1 could be
considered a “final result.”41
40This does not hold in the general equilibrium.
41Below we show that lobbying can never induce an excess demand for labor. This is
critical to determine the general equilibrium adjustment that the economy will face.
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4.2.2 The negotiated market structure: further insights
Discontinuity of Np(λ,E, r)
The non-quasiconcavity of Upol(N,E, r) is a feature that arises only for cer-
tain parameter values, and it is materialized in the possible existence of
multiple market structures that satisfy the first-order condition presented
in (32). More specifically, it may originate up to two local maxima (besides
a possible local minimum) in the objective function. However, the conse-
quences of this technical issue also spread to the general equilibrium, since it
may originate discontinuities in the labor demand when exogenous param-
eters are altered (and in particular when the level of expenditures change).
For this reason, it is crucial to understand what originates such behavior.
First of all, observe that Upol(N,E, r) depends on the balance of the
utility of the representative individual and overall profits, and there is no
reason why this balance should be monotonic in the number of firms. For
example, it may happen that a very low concentration scheme generates
an amount of profits expressive enough to overcome the loss in welfare,
originating a negotiated market structure which is locally optimal. A slight
increase in the active number of firms can imply a quick dissipation of profits,
depending on the fierceness of competition, instigating a reduction in the
utility of the policy-maker, but when the number of firms in the market
increases further, the responsiveness of aggregate profits with respect to the
market size is reduced, and the gain in individual utility may now offset
the decline in the amount of contributions received by the policy-maker,
creating another locally optimal market structure. According to (33), the
politician will select a market structure among the above which yields him
the highest utility.
As the above balance is affected when exogenous parameters are altered,
the selected number of firms may change discontinuously when these param-
eters vary, i.e. the global maximum may change its location.
The effect of λ and E
We now analyze how the negotiated market structure changes with the pref-
erence for political contributions and with the level of expenditures.
Preference for contributions (λ). The negotiated market structure,
Np(λ,E, r), is generally decreasing in the political weight given to contribu-
tions. The intuition is that a higher λ makes contributions more important
to the policy-maker, who will therefore increase concentration in the indus-
try in order to appropriate larger profits in equilibrium. If Upol(N,E, r) is
not quasiconcave, this decrease does not need to be continuous. Since the
marginal change in profits is much more significant in highly concentrated
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markets, a sudden decrease in the active number of firms may be the optimal
choice for the policy-maker.
Individual Expenditures (E). Additionally, Np(λ,E, r) is also decreas-
ing in expenditures. The intuition is that an increase in E enhances the level
of gross profits in the market relative to the wage rate, our numeraire, which
makes contributions more attractive, without compromising the objectives
in terms of utility. Hence, a reduction in the number of firms allows the
policy-maker to appropriate a larger share of profits, while refraining the
decrease in utility due to a reduction in the number of varieties and to an
escalation in prices with a higher growth rate. However, since an increase in
E has a much stronger impact over aggregate profits for low concentration
schemes, as an excessive level of competition may lead firms to intensify their
R&D activities in an attempt to appropriate such extra profits, making them
to vanish very quickly, the policy-maker may opt for a sudden decrease in the
active number of firms. In this way, he may appropriate immediately a large
fraction of this extra amount through political contributions. A decrease in
aggregate expenditures has the opposite effect, reducing growth and the
level of profits in the market, and shifting the concerns of the policy-maker
towards the utility of voters.
4.3 General equilibrium with lobbying
We now reintroduce the two general equilibrium conditions of the model
that enable us to fully characterize the new steady-state in this economy
under the presence of lobbying – the labor market clearing condition and
the intertemporal profile of per capita expenditures required by consumer’s
utility maximization. When bargaining over the market structure, both
agents take the level of expenditures as given. However, any shift in market
structure changes individual decisions undertaken by firms, possibly creating
a disequilibrium in the labor market that needs to be corrected through an
adjustment in per capita expenditures. In turn, as expenditures jump to a
new level, the number of firms that comes out of the political process must
also change, since the marginal incentives faced by agents are shifted with
E. This story implies that, in a steady-state with lobbying and fully rational
players, Np(λ,E, r) must be set taking into account the interaction between
the number of firms itself and per capita expenditures, as determined by the
labor market clearing condition
Np(λ,E, r) · LX
(
Np(λ,E, r), E
)
+ Lz
(
Np(λ,E, r), E, r
)
= L (34)
Hence, with perfectly foresighted players, the economy jumps immediately
to the new steady-state following the introduction of lobbying from a laissez-
faire free-entry situation. Furthermore, as expenditures are still be a jump
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variable that adjusts at all times to satisfy the labor market clearing con-
dition, it follows that r = ρ. Note that equation (34) summarizes a com-
plex relationship. It states that, in the general equilibrium, given equilib-
rium expenditures Ep, the policy-maker restricts the number of firms to
Np = Np(λ,Ep, ρ), and given that there are Np active firms in the market,
the equilibrium level of expenditures is Ep. In this sense, Ep is a fixed point
of (34).
Unlike the free-entry case, equation (34) may not define a unique equi-
libria. To check this, observe that an increase in E presents two opposing
effects over labor demand. The first is a direct (positive) effect, materialized
into an expansion in production and innovation activities for the same num-
ber of firms, which results from an increase in gross-profits. The second is an
indirect (negative) effect, which is translated into a decline in labor demand,
motivated by the incentives of the policy-maker to restrict the number of
R&D licences granted to firms. Furthermore, note that this decline may
be continuous or discrete, since the selected number of firms may change
discontinuously with E. Hence, labor demand may not be monotonically
increasing in E, nor even continuous, which implies that we may have a
multiplicity of equilibria, each characterized by different growth and welfare
implications. Additionally, the existence of a fixed point is also not assured.
This is particularly relevant for large values of λ, since in a highly concen-
trated market the few surviving firms may not employ enough resources to
generate an equilibrium in the labor market, regardless of the size of ag-
gregate demand. We discuss in greater detail the implications of multiple
equilibria, as well as non-existence, later in this section. Here, we will simple
assume that an equilibrium with lobbying exists and is well defined.42
4.3.1 General equilibrium and labor market adjustment
In order to dissect the general equilibrium effects brought in by political
contributions, we must first analyze how the labor market reacts to a change
in the market structure. Although we cannot determine the value of Ep
directly, it is still possible to establish a comparison with the free-entry
equilibrium value. Using the expression for profits and rearranging, we can
express aggregate R&D alternatively as
Lz
(
N,E, r
)
=
LE
ξ(N)
−Nφ−Π(N,E, r) (35)
Plugging (35) in the labor market clearing condition, and making use of the
equilibrium market structure and the condition which defines the optimal
saving policy of households, we obtain Ep = Ef + Π(Np, Ep, ρ)/L. Since
profits must be positive in an equilibrium with lobbying, if an equilibrium
42Although we do not explicitly formalize the possibility of multiple equilibria in this
section, the results provided here can also be extended for this scenario.
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exists we must have Ep > Ef . The intuition for this result works as follows.
A lower N is not only reflected in a higher price and a lower quantity in
equilibrium, but also entails a reduction in aggregate fixed costs. Hence,
it follows that total labor used in production decreases, for a given level of
expenditures. Conversely, by increasing the level of gross profits, a higher
concentration makes R&D more attractive, which leads to an increase in the
total amount of real resources applied to the development of higher quality
products, at least while the market is not too concentrated. Although these
two effects work in opposite directions, the former always dominates the
latter, and a more concentrated market employs a lower number of workers
overall, for a given level of per capita expenditures. Hence, any decrease
in the number of firms operating in the market results in an excess labor
supply. Since labor demand is increasing in aggregate demand, LE, given the
number of firms, expenditures must increase in order to restore equilibria.
We can thereby postulate the following lemma
Lemma 1. Assume an equilibrium with lobbying exists. Then, equilibrium
expenditures in the presence of lobbying are higher relative to the laissez-faire
free-entry general equilibrium.
Observe carefully the implications of this result. Lobbying is able to
sustain a lower number of firms in the market as compared to free-entry,
enabling firms to achieve a positive level of profits. Part of these profits
are given to the policy-maker as contributions, while the remaining are dis-
tributed as dividends to consumers. The policy-maker, in turn, redistributes
his proceedings back to consumers, under the form of lump-sum transfers.
In the end, expenditures are higher because the income of consumers has
increased, and with it the value of the consumption basket they are able to
afford.43 Additionally, lemma 1 can also be given a different interpretation,
in terms of the labor market. Since we chose the wage rate as numeraire, the
increase per capita expenditures can be seen as an increase in E/w, or con-
versely, a decrease in the wage rate relative to expenditures. Hence, an alter-
native and perhaps more intuitive interpretation is that lobbying decreases
labor demand, creating unemployment for a given wage rate. Equilibrium
in the labor market can only be reestablished through a decrease in w/E.
Nominal income of consumers relative to expenditures, however, remains
unchanged, since dividends and lump-sum transfers balance completely the
decline in the wage rate.
Finally, note that the composition of labor demand has changed. Since
aggregate R&D is hump-shaped in N and increasing in E, it must go up
in the general equilibrium, at least while concentration in the market is
43Note that this is different than saying that they are able to afford a higher number of
goods. An increase in concentration also raises the price consumers have to pay for each
variety.
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Table 1: Lobbying – impact on welfare
Number of firms (N) Expenditures (E)
Effects Variety Compet. Growth-N Growth-E Expendit. Welfare
Partial Eq. − − + −
General Eq. − − + + + +
Welfare − − + + + ?
maintained at moderate levels. Since labor supply is constant, labor applied
in production must be lower. We can therefore put forward our second
lemma:
Lemma 2. Assume an equilibrium with lobbying exists. Then, in the gen-
eral equilibrium, if the preference for political contributions is not excessively
high, lobbying induces a substitution between labor used in production and
labor applied in R&D as compared to the laissez-faire free-entry general equi-
librium.
4.3.2 Equilibrium growth and welfare with lobbying
Let Lpz = Lz
(
Np, Ep, ρ
)
denote equilibrium R&D. The equilibrium growth
and welfare are, respectively
gp = θ · 1 + γ(N
p − 1)
Np
· Lpz
and,
Up =
1
ρ
[
1
ε− 1
logNp + log
ξ(Np)− 1
ξ(Np)
+
gp
ρ
+ logEp
]
Figure 4 compares the current outcome with lobbying with that obtained
under the laissez-faire equilibrium.44 Note that it is not the shift in the
market structure that is driving the increase in welfare, but the general
equilibrium effects of lobbying over aggregate expenditures. Overall, we can
identify five effects at work here, that are able to influence society’s welfare
when an equilibrium with lobbying is compared to the free-entry outcome –
three common both to the partial and general equilibrium, and two exclu-
sively with general equilibrium foundations. These effects are summarized
in table 1.
The introduction of lobbying in the economy leads some firms to leave
the market, therefore increasing concentration and reducing labor demand,
given the level of expenditures – this generates the partial equilibrium effects
44The labor demand plotted in the figure is a general equilibrium labor demand, i.e.,
it represents the demand for labor for the general equilibrium number of firms. In other
words, it is the left hand side of equation (34), which takes into account how a change in
E is reflected in the equilibrium number of firms itself.
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Figure 4: Lobbying generates an increase in per capita expenditures; growth increases and
welfare may also increase.
analyzed before. In the general equilibrium, however, labor market clearing
requires a decrease in the price of labor relative to expenditures. Since the
number of firms bargained between the policy-maker and the lobby responds
endogenously to this adjustment, concentration in the market will increase
further. Ceteris paribus (given E), this adjustment only extends the partial
equilibrium effects – a higher markup, a lower number of varieties, and a
(possibly) higher growth rate –, with a negative repercussion over utility.
Furthermore, a lower unitary cost of production relative to the size of de-
mand means that the level of gross-profits per unit of labor, for the same N ,
has become higher, which fosters R&D and consequently economic growth.
This implies that the growth schedule shifts upwards, providing consumers
with a more robust increase in welfare over time – the first exclusive general
equilibrium effect of lobbying over utility. Finally, note that products have
become cheaper relative to the size of aggregate demand. Consumers are
now able to afford a larger set of goods for the same number of firms – the
second exclusive general equilibrium effect of lobbying over utility. The im-
pact of lobbying over welfare depends on the complex interaction between
these five effects. In particular, if the effects implied by the reduction in
the number of firms can be completely offset by the two specific general
equilibrium effects, which mirror the increase in aggregate expenditures, the
new equilibrium comprises a higher welfare as compared to the laissez-faire
free-entry equilibrium. We summarize this discussion in the following result:
Result 2. Assume an equilibrium with lobbying exists. Then, when com-
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pared to the laissez-faire free-entry general equilibrium, lobbying:
(i) decreases the active number of firms;
(ii) increases the growth rate (if the preference for political contributions
is not excessively high);
(iii) may increase welfare.
It follows that lobbying might be able to improve welfare over a welfare
maximizing free-entry equilibrium, through an increase in the relative size
of demand, which is materialized in the general equilibrium. Note that, if λ
is allowed to take high values, theoretically the growth rate may not neces-
sarily increase, since a higher market concentration would actually decrease
labor applied in R&D, which would balance against the general equilibrium
effect of expenditures in the growth schedule. However, as long an equilib-
rium exists, our numerical results suggest that the general equilibrium effect
prevails and growth always increases.
This result can also be examined from an intertemporal perspective of
consumption. Despite the increase in households’ income, due to the extra
profits generated by firms, there are now fewer products, and all of them
have become more expensive. The latter two effects dominate, and hence
lobbying as a negative impact on present consumption – had the growth rate
stayed unchanged, consumption would have never increase, at any point in
time, in virtue of lobbying. However, by changing individual incentives
faced by firms, the actions of a voracious policy-maker are able, although
indirectly, to increase the rate of innovation in the economy, enabling a more
significant and sustained increase in the services provided by those goods
over time. It is this increase in the growth rate that supports the potential
welfare gain with lobbying, as compared to free-entry.
4.4 General equilibrium: Additional issues
4.4.1 General equilibrium and steady-state multiplicity
The number of equilibriums in this economy is determined by the number
of values of E that satisfy the labor market clearing condition, represented
by equation (34). Since labor demand, in the general equilibrium, does not
need to be monotonically increasing in per capita expenditures, nor even
continuous, different values of E may lead to the same quantity of labor
demanded by firms. While we were not able to determine analytically the
maximum number of possible equilibriums, our numerical results suggest
that the economy may have up to three distinct steady-states, each endowed
with different growth and welfare implications. In order to understand why,
let us separately analyze under which circumstances we may have two or
three equilibra. These two cases are illustrated in appendix A.3.
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The case of two equilibria. A situation with two equilibria may arise if
labor demand is not continuous in per capita expenditures, which, in turn,
requires that N(λ,E, ρ) is not continuous in E. As we discussed before,
such situation can only occur if a small increase in per capita expenditures
is able to potentiate an expansion in aggregate profits in such a way that the
policy-maker is better off by changing completely the policy in the benefit of
firms. As this shift is materialized in a nearly monopolistic market structure,
further increases in E will not have anymore any significant impact on the
active number of firms. This implies that, although labor demand tends to
be predominantly increasing in E, there exists a critical level of expenditures
where the indirect effect of a fall in the number of firms will predominate, and
labor demand falls discontinuously at that point. Therefore, the equilibrium
condition in the labor market can be satisfied for, at most, two distinct levels
of expenditures.
The case of three equilibria. A situation with three equilibria may arise
if the decrease in the labor demand determined by the decline in the active
number of firms due to an increase in E is able to overcome the direct effect
of per capita expenditures on labor demand. However, such state of affairs
can only occur if the incentives of the policy-maker are highly responsive to
E, situation in which the selected number of firms converges very quickly
to its lower bound. Once this adjustment is undertaken, the indirect effect
of expenditures over labor demand dissipates, and only the direct effect
remains. Hence, labor demand in the general equilibrium can present at
most one region where it is decreasing in E (conversely increasing in 1/E),
which implies that we may have, at most, three fixed points in equation
(34).
The existence multiple equilibria leads to the crucial question of how the
economy selects between them. Since N is a jumping variable, all equilibria
are feasible, and the selection between different equilibria depends exclu-
sively on agents expectations about future entry, exit, price, investment and
political contributions. However, none of these equilibria is predominantly
superior in terms of welfare, i.e., depending on the structure of the economy,
there does not exist one equilibrium that systematically dominates the oth-
ers, or that systematically dominates the free-entry equilibrium. Hence, all
the analysis developed in the previous section can be extended to immedi-
ately contemplate the current cases, as long as one considers the equilibrium
represented therein as one of the possible three equilibria that may exist in
the model.45
45However, our calibration results, that we report in the next section, hint that only one
equilibrium with lobbying exists when the parameters are selected in order to represent
the long-run macroeconomic facts of the U.S. economy.
33
4.4.2 Non-existence of general equilibrium
As we observed before, the existence of an equilibrium in the labor market
is not assured. However, this situation can only occur if the preference
for political contributions is sufficiently high, since only then total labor
demanded by firms may not suffice to attain full employment, no matter
the level of expenditures. To understand this fact recall that, as E increases
to correct for disequilibriums in the labor market, the incentives of the
policy-maker are also changing towards further restrictions in the number of
R&D licences emitted, which pushes aggregate labor demand in the opposite
direction. If λ is large enough, then the market structure converges to the
monopolistic case at a rate which may be sufficient to induce an excess labor
supply for all values of per capita expenditures, as illustrated in appendix
A.4. In such situation, aggregate R&D approaches zero (as the maximization
condition of firms originates a corner solution at Lz = 0), and so does total
sales (as the price level converges to infinity), and therefore it follows that
total labor demand converges to φ for finite E. Hence, the following result
arises:
Result 3. If the preference for political contributions is sufficiently high, no
general equilibrium exists with lobbying.
As a fully voracious policy-maker always sets a monopolistic market
structure, an immediate corollary emerges:
Corollary 1. There exists no general equilibrium with lobbying if the policy-
maker if fully voracious.
Finally, note that it is always possible to find an upper bound for λ below
which an equilibrium is always defined. Our general equilibrium analysis pre-
sented thus far assumed implicitly such condition, so that no non-existence
problems arose.
4.5 Preference for contributions and welfare: the possibility
of non-linear effects
A crucial question in our model is how equilibrium welfare changes as the
policy-maker becomes more voracious. While the effects of a larger pref-
erence for political contributions are obvious regarding equilibrium market
structure and equilibrium growth, the same is not true when welfare comes
into consideration. Various combinations are possible, including (monoton-
ically) positive and negative relationships between equilibrium utility and
λ. There is, however, a stunning possibility – the existence of a non-linear
relationship between equilibrium welfare and the weight of contributions in
the policy-maker’s utility function, as illustrated in figure 5.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium growth and welfare when there exists a non-linear relationship
between the latter and the preference for contributions.
This possibility arises because the interaction between the five effects
that drive the change in welfare under lobbying as compared to the laissez-
faire equilibrium is highly influenced by the value of λ. For smaller values
of λ, it may happen that the increase in aggregate demand relative to the
cost of labor, which raises the growth rate and allows consumers to buy
more goods for the same number of firms, is able to offset the escalation
in the price level and the fall in the number of varieties that occurs in
equilibrium, determining an increase in welfare. However, slightly higher
values of λ may originate the reverse interaction and lead to a decline in
utility. Intuitively, households may be willing to accept a small increase
in concentration in exchange for an expansion in aggregate income and a
higher growth rate, but regard a large decrease in the number of varieties
as substantially harmful, even if it is associated to a higher income. Hence,
we can bring forward the following:
Result 4. Equilibrium welfare may change non-linearly in response to an
increase in the preference factor for political contributions.
4.6 Steady-state contributions
In order to pin down the effects of lobbying over equilibrium growth and
welfare, it is sufficient to model an efficient bargain between the lobby and
the policy-maker; the way contributions are determined in equilibrium is
completely irrelevant. This only occurs because we have assumed that the
policy-maker distributes the proceeds from contributions back to households,
through lump-sum transfers, since, in this case, households’ expenditures do
not depend on the distribution of surplus. However, in order to close the
model, something should be said about the equilibrium level of contribu-
tions.
The total amount of surplus generated in the bargain is simply the in-
crease in aggregate profits minus the net revenue of the policy-maker neces-
sary to leave him indifferent between a market structure of Np and Nf . Note
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that the policy-maker may not be reimbursed in equilibrium – since expendi-
tures increase, lobbying may originate an increase in utility as compared to
free-entry, and ex-post the policy-maker may even be willing to pay in order
to provide households with such utility gain. Making use of the individual
rationality constraints plus the free-entry condition Π(Nf , Ef , ρ) = 0, the
equilibrium surplus per unit of time becomes
S = Πp +
ρ ·
[
Up − Uf
]
λ′
where Πp = Π(Np, Ep, ρ) denotes the total amount of instantaneous profits
(before contributions are paid) with lobbying and the remaining notation
was previously introduced. Assume both players have agreed to share this
surplus, such that the lobby obtains a share α ∈ [0, 1] of this amount, while
the remaining surplus is allocated to the policy-maker.46 Hence, the lobby
will obtain instantaneous profits net of contributions totaling Π = αS, while
the policy-maker attains an utility of U = (λ′/ρ)·(1−α)S. Finally, using the
individual rationality constraint for the lobby, instantaneous contributions
become
Ψp = (1− α)S +
ρ ·
[
Uf − Up
]
λ′
which states that firm’s contributions can be decomposed into the sum of the
share of surplus generated by the bargain that was assigned to the policy-
maker with the minimum net revenue necessary to make the policy-maker
indifferent between a market structure of Np and Nf .
5 A calibration exercise
In order to provide a better match to the long-run features of the U.S.
economy, we start by extending the model to contemplate a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) flow utility. In this way, we can appropriately take
into account a significant branch of the literature, which suggests that the
elasticity of marginal utility is greater than one. Afterwards, we calibrate
the model for the U.S. economy and illustrate how lobbying might have
influenced the determinants of long-run growth and welfare.
5.1 Extending the model: The CRRA specification
Here, we briefly summarize the main changes introduced in the model when
the flow utility is extended to a CRRA specification. The typical household
now seeks to maximize the following lifetime utility
46This analysis relies on the notion of Asymmetric Nash Bargain, along the lines of
Binmore et al. (1986)
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u(t) =
∫ ∞
t
C(τ)1−σ − 1
1− σ
e−ρ(τ−t)dτ, σ > 1
subject to the usual budget constraint. The first-order condition can be
immediately obtained
Ė
E
=
r − ρ
σ
+
σ − 1
σ
ṖC
PC
(36)
The demand schedules are the same as before, as well as the characterization
of the economic market and the growth function. The partial equilibrium
is also as before, except that, in the case of lobbying, the utility function of
the policy-maker must contemplate the new lifetime utility of households,
which can be summarized as
U(N,E, r) =
[
N1/(ε−1)E
(
ξ(N)− 1
)
/ξ(N)
]1−σ
(1− σ)g(N,E, r)− ρ
Free-entry: the general equilibrium
Under free-entry, labor market clearing in the current framework still implies
an equilibrium value for expenditures of unity. Since PC is a quality weighted
price index, it evolves over time according to the symmetric of the growth
rate, i.e. ṖC/PC = −g(N,E, r). Intuitively, goods are becoming cheaper
over time as compared to the services they are able to provide, and hence
the price of the consumption basket must be falling at the rate quality is
increasing. Making use of this relationship in (36), plus the fact that Ef = 1,
the equilibrium interest rate is the fixed point of the following equation
r = ρ+ (σ − 1)g
(
Nf (1, r), 1, r
)
(37)
Some numerical exercises show that existence is not always assured, but for
the calibrated parameters the issue of non-existence does not arise. Using the
equilibrium values for r and E, we can immediately obtain the equilibrium
market structure, growth, and welfare.
Lobbying: the general equilibrium
With lobbying, the equilibrium pair (E, r) must solve simultaneously the
labor market clearing condition,
Np(λ,E, r) · LX
(
Np(λ,E, r), E
)
+ Lz
(
Np(λ,E, r), E, r
)
= L
and the intertemporal profile of per capita expenditures implied by house-
holds utility maximization
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r = ρ+ (σ − 1)g
(
Np(λ,E, r), E, r
)
(38)
Again, existence and uniqueness are not guaranteed, but, if an equilibrium
exists, it is numerically possible, through an iterative procedure, to recover
the values for expenditures and the interest rate, and subsequently the mar-
ket structure, growth and welfare. We will, however, undertake a different
approach, explained below.
5.2 Calibration of the model
Several parameters in our model have close real-world counterparts and so
they can be calibrated directly from the data. For this purpose, we follow
related studies of numerical R&D models. Others, however, require a more
indirect approach. Since lobbying and campaign contributions comprehend
billions of dollars every year, we interpret our benchmark calibration as rep-
resentative of an outcome with lobbying. Thereafter, we proceed backwards,
identifying what would be the outcome for the U.S. economy had lobbying
been completely prohibited in the first place, and compare the long-run
economic performance between the two situations.
Matched empirical facts
We calibrate the model such that the equilibrium interest and growth rates
match the U.S. empirical data. This implies that some parameters of the
model must be calibrated internally. The long-term interest rate (rp) is
set to 7 percent, which is the estimated average real rate of return on the
stock market over the past century (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Jones and
Williams, 2000).47 The growth rate (gp) is set to 2.1 percent, which is the
estimated growth rate of consumption per capita for the post-war period, as
reported in Comin (2004).48 This value is also comprised within the GDP
per capita growth rates reported in the literature for the same period of time,
which range from 1.7 to 2.3 percent, depending on the data source and on
the time span considered. We admit a range of values for the number of
workers in R&D (Lp) between 12 and 15 percent, consistent with the data
provided by the International Labor Organization for the manufacturing
sector.
47As Jones and Williams (2000) note, since the interest rate in R&D driven models is
also the rate of return to R&D, it cannot be calibrated to the risk-free rate on t-bills.
48Since the growth rate in our model corresponds to that of consumption, we feel more
comfortable with this approach rather than calibrating gp according to the GDP per capita
growth rate.
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A typical calibration
We normalize the population to one, since the model becomes easier to
calibrate and seems to perform better relative to alternative values of L.
In accordance with the literature (e.g. Strulik, 2007; Funke and Strulik,
2000), we set the benchmark value for the elasticity of marginal utility (σ)
to 2. According to the general equilibrium condition (38), this implies an
intertemporal discount factor of 0.049.
Contrary to most models of endogenous growth that consider the case of
monopolistic competition, the value of the elasticity of substitution between
two different varieties (ε) in our model cannot be directly obtained through
the empirical estimates of the markup price, since these depend on the
equilibrium number of firms, which is endogenously determined. Therefore,
we undertake a slightly different approach here. We set a reasonable value
for ε, and require, ex-post, that the equilibrium markup is comprised within
an acceptable range; otherwise we re-calibrate the value of ε. The literature
is not unanimous as regards to the markup price, providing different values
depending on the type of product considered. Some empirical estimates
suggest lower values for the markup, ranging up to 40 percent (e.g. Basu,
1996), while others hint slightly higher values, which can exceed 70 percent
(e.g. Roeger, 1995; Funke and Strulik, 2000). Consistent with this, and also
attending to the fact that our model considers quality driven R&D, which
is usually associated to larger markups, in part due to the market power
conferred by the patent system, we define an acceptable range for p of 1.4-
1.6. After some trial and error, we found a value of ε = 6 performs quite
well, frequently providing a price level within this interval.
Another parameter which has to be recovered through a similar method
is the quantity of labor associated to overhead expenditures per firm (φ),
since only the total amount, Np · φ, can be retrieved from the data. De-
pending on how one classifies some activities as fixed or variable costs of
production, and on the time span considered, the labor allocated to fixed
cost activities in the manufacturing sector seems to range from 10 to 20 per-
cent of total labor, according to the statistical database of the International
Labor Organization. Hence, we define a value of φ such that, ex-post, Np ·φ
is within this range. After some experiments, we decided to set φ at 0.07.
The elasticity of quality with respect to R&D (θ) and the level of spillovers
(γ) have to be calibrated simultaneously. Let us suppose, for a moment, that
we know the true value of λ – the value that, given θ and γ, implies an equi-
librium level of per capita expenditures such that equilibrium growth equals
the calibrated value of 2.1 percent. We call this consistency condition –
ex-post, the model must be consistent, in sense that it must generate the
same growth rate that we initially assumed to retrieve the discount factor;
otherwise, at least one of the general equilibrium conditions is violated. The
consistency condition is automatically violated if, given θ and γ, no value of
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Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Value
Interest rate rp .07
Growth rate gp .021
Population L 1
Marginal elasticity of substitution σ 2
Elasticity of substitution between varieties ε 6
Spillovers γ .7
Quality-R&D elasticity θ .18
Fixed cost φ .07
Discount factor ρ .049
λ assures an equilibrium growth of 2.1 percent. Given this requirement, we
can numerically find an interval for (θ, γ) such that the model is consistent
and the equilibrium labor allocated to R&D is between 12 and 15 percent.
The acceptable range for θ lies between 0.15 and 0.20 – values above this
interval do not respect the consistency condition, while values below this
interval do not replicate U.S. empirical facts on labor allocated to R&D,
for any value of spillovers. Given this range for θ, we can numerically find
a lower bound for γ as a function of θ, γ(θ), with γ′(θ) > 0, above which
the model is always consistent and provides reasonable values for R&D. For
our benchmark, we set θ = 0.18 and γ = 0.7, which is compatible with an
R&D labor share around 13.6 percent. Table 2 summarizes our benchmark
calibration.
Retrieving the preference for political contributions (λ)
Above, we assumed that we knew the value of λ such that, for each pair
(θ, γ), the model was kept consistent. However, the value of λ that enables
the model to replicate the empirical growth rate that we have initially as-
sumed has also to be determined. In particular, this value must be such that
the equilibrium level of expenditures and the equilibrium market structure
yield a growth rate exactly equal to 2.1 percent. In practice, we proceed
as follows. Given certain values for θ and γ, we define a grid for λ and
compute the equilibrium for each value in that grid. Then, we select the
value of λ such that the equilibrium growth rate equals the pre-set one. If
no λ replicates the empirical facts that we considered initially, we change
the pair (θ, γ) and redo the calculations. The selected triplet (θ, γ, λ) must
satisfy the following two requirements: an equilibrium with a growth rate
of 2.1 percent must exist and the share of labor allocated to R&D must be
comprised between 12 and 15 percent.
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Identifying the free-entry growth rate
With our calibrated parameters, we can immediately retrieve the equilibrium
growth rate for the unobserved laissez-faire framework. In fact, all that is
necessary is to solve (37), considering the value of ρ obtained from the
calibrated model above. Once we extract rf , characterizing the free-entry
equilibrium is immediate.
5.3 Results
The results are summarized in table 3 and illustrated in figure 6. For the
calibrated model, we estimated a free-entry growth rate of 1.73 percent,
almost .4 percentage points below the empirical value. This outcome is
mainly motivated by the 2 percentage points difference in labor allocated to
R&D between the two situations, and suggests that lobbying may influence
the long-run performance of the U.S. economy. In addition, with lobbying,
industry profits are positive, representing about 5 percent of the total income
of workers, and concentration is slightly larger, as well as the markup, when
compared to free-entry. In which concerns to welfare, lobbying represents
a welfare gain of 3.5 percent in consumption equivalent terms, sustained
through lower consumption at time 0, but a higher consumption pattern
later on. This time path for consumption is supported by the paradigm
varieties-price/expenditures-growth, with the later being key to explain how
entry restrictions are able to improve upon the free-entry equilibrium. These
results are qualitatively robust to every suitable sensitivity analysis that we
undertook.
One striking feature of the calibrated model is that lobbying does not
only raise welfare, but also that equilibrium welfare is increasing in total
lobbying efforts. In this stance, one could attain higher growth rates and
larger utility gains if policy-makers in the U.S. economy were even more
voracious and more eager for political contributions. This apparent para-
doxical result, however, has its foundations in a crucial assumption of the
model – contributions are redistributed back to households, in the form of
lump-sum transfers. While this assumption enabled us to make the model
highly tractable, it may not be completely realistic, since policy-makers are
not getting hold of any direct benefit that could be obtained from these
contributions. Below, we numerically generalize the model so that only a
fraction of total profits is redistributed back to households; the remaining
will be spent by politicians for their own personal benefits.
5.4 Extending the model: the role of contributions
Let us consider now that the policy-maker uses the proceeds from contri-
butions to buy goods from firms, instead to redistributing them back to
households. In particular, suppose that the policy-maker shares the same
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Table 3: Calibration results
Parameter Lobbying Free-entry
Preference for contributions λ .4444 —–
Expenditures E 1.0520 —–
Industry Profits Π .0520 —–
Relative wage w/E .9505 —–
1 - Lerner Index l .6980 .7313
Markup p− 1 .4327 .3673
R&D labor share Lz .1355 .1150
Share of labor used in production N · LX .8645 .8850
Share of variable costs N ·X .7343 .7013
Share of fixed costs N · φ .1302 .1537
Interest rate r .0700 .0663
Growth rate g .0210 .0173
Utility gain (%) 2.48 —–
Consumption equivalent gain (%) 3.5 —–
Consumption gain at t (%) -2.96 —–
Consumption gain after 10 years (%) .78 —–
Consumption gain after 25 years (%) 6.53 —–
Consumption gain after 50 years (%) 16.83 —–
preferences of households as regards to intermediate goods, such that his
demand schedule his identical. His preferences for contributions are still
driven by the same utility function as before. In such framework, the de-
mand schedule faced by each firm is identical to that of the benchmark
model, which implies that equilibrium expenditures and growth remain un-
changed. Households’ income and consequently equilibrium welfare are now
lower, since a fraction of the economy’s income will be spent by politicians;
however, the exact amount in which equilibrium welfare is depressed depends
on the distribution of surplus between the lobby and the policy-maker. This
alternative specification extols the role of the Nash Bargaining process in
the final welfare allocation, since, depending on the share of surplus that is
redistributed back to households, welfare can increase or decrease as com-
pared to the laissez-faire equilibrium. These interactions are illustrated in
figure 7.
Table 4 and figure 8 summarize the results, for an asymmetric Nash
Bargain in which 60 percent of the surplus is allocated to households. Since
the outcomes for the Lerner index, markup, R&D share, interest rate and
growth rate are similar or identical to those presented in table 3, we omit
them for brevity. Notably, since households’ income is now about 2 percent
less relative to the previous calibration, the utility gain is now much lower.
That is, although consumption growth remains unchanged, households have
now to renounce to a larger fraction of consumption at moment 0, and
hence more time needs to be elapsed until the benefits of lobbying are felt
over instantaneous welfare. Equilibrium welfare now depends non-linearly
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Figure 6: Calibration results – Lobbying may increase welfare as compared to the laissez-
faire free-entry equilibrium.
on the preference for political contributions, due to a shift in the the forces
that drive the paradigm varieties-price/expenditures-growth, which resulted
from a less noteworthy increase in aggregate demand from households. This
change in the model puts an upper bound on the benefits that can be ex-
tracted through lobbying. For the current calibrated parameters, welfare
gains with lobbying can be obtained if at least approximately 50 percent of
the surplus is allocated to households.
  Consumers (L)
Expenditures 
(Eh = w + D) 
Firms (N)  
Wages (w); Contributions (Ψ) 
Dividends (D = Π) 
Policy‐maker
Revenues (EP = Ψ) 
Buy goods (expenditures equal E
h
)
Pay wages (w) and distribute dividends (D)
Defines potential market profits (Π + Ψ)
through the choice of a market structure (N) 
Make contributions (Ψ) 
Buys goods (expenditures equal E
P
)
Figure 7: Venn diagram with the interaction between economic agents, in the modified
model.
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Table 4: Calibration results for the modified model
Parameter Lobbying Free-entry
Distribution of surplus (fraction)
Firms (households) .6 —–
Policy-maker .4 —–
Preference for contributions λ .4493
Total expenditures E 1.0520
Household expenditures Eh 1.0312
Policy-maker expenditures EP .0208
Industry profits before contributions Π .0520
Utility gain (%) .51 —–
Consumption equivalent gain (%) .69 —–
Consumption gain at t (%) -4.78 —–
Consumption gain after 10 years (%) -1.23 —–
Consumption gain after 25 years (%) 4.40 —–
Consumption gain after 50 years (%) 14.48 —–
5.5 The role of lobbying: a reassessment
In general terms, our model suggests that special interest groups – firms –
lobby decision-makers in exchange for more favorable policies – legislation
– that, to some extent, influence market structure and the profitability of
firms. Ceteris paribus, this change in policy is apparently harmful for the
society, a conclusion that is in line to what is usually perceived in the liter-
ature as the effects of rent-seeking over economic activity. In terms of our
model, this change in legislation originates less competition in the product
market, leading to higher prices and a reduction in the number of brands
(which can be, to some extent, refrained through the increase in the growth
rate).
Nevertheless, as we stated in the beginning, the costs incurred by firms in
lobbying and campaign contributions represent a small fraction of the ben-
efits they can reap from such activities, which hints that the distribution of
surplus generated from the bargain between lobbies and decision-makers is
biased in the benefit of the former, such as in the example in table 4. If this
is the case, a significant fraction of this surplus is converted into dividends,
increasing households’ income and expanding aggregate demand. Although
this shift in aggregate demand is not enough to prevent the fall in present
consumption, households will most certainly benefit from higher future con-
sumption, since firms realize that one unit of R&D is now more profitable
and increase the rate of product innovation. Together, these two effects – a
higher growth rate and a larger aggregate demand – are responsible for the
raise in welfare as compared to the laissez-faire free entry equilibrium.
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Figure 8: Calibration results for the modified model – Lobbying may increase welfare as
compared to the laissez-faire free-entry equilibrium, however equilibrium growth depends
non-linearly on λ.
6 Concluding remarks
We have argued that the effects of lobbying over economic growth and wel-
fare can only be truly analyzed in a model which explicitly takes into account
the interaction between policy-makers and firms, and the inherent partial
and general equilibrium repercussions over the economy. Along these lines,
we found that lobbying, although prejudicial for the society in a sectorial
perspective, may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing laissez-faire
free-entry equilibrium, once the general equilibrium adjustments over eco-
nomic aggregates are taken into consideration. This result introduces a new
paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic per-
formance.
Much is left to be done, though. A complete and integrated analysis
of the impact of some rent-seeking phenomena over economic growth and
welfare can only be achieved through a deeper understanding of the interac-
tions between economic agents and consequent repercussions over economic
activity. The literature as systematically neglected this interaction, which
we believe is crucial to explain the relationship between rent-seeking and
economic performance.
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Appendix
A Additional figures
A.1 Gross-profit effect versus business-stealing effect
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Figure 9: The gross-profit and the business-stealing effects and the shape of the growth
rate (population normalized to one).
A.2 The laissez-faire equilibrium
Figure 10: Welfare and growth under free-entry: the benchmark case (population normal-
ized to one).
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A.3 Lobbying and the general equilibrium – multiple equi-
libria
Figure 11: The labor market: multiple equilibria (population normalized to one).
A.4 Lobbying and the general equilibrium – non-existence
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Figure 12: The labor market: non-existence of general equilibrium (population normalized
to one).
B The hump-shaped utility case
Industry equilibrium
In the case where the utility of the representative individual is not every-
where increasing in l, lobbying might boost both welfare and growth relative
to the laissez-faire equilibrium, as depicted below. By restricting the number
of R&D licences, the policy-maker is be able to increase market profitability
to a substantial extent, thereby planting seeds to a more fierce competition
between the surviving firms, who will seek to capture the largest share of this
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amount through more frequent quality improvements in their products. If
the resulting increase in the growth rate is able to overcome the higher price
level and the fall in the number of varieties, then consumers will be better
off with lobbying. Observe, however, that it is not lobbying per se that is
driving welfare up, but the simple option to change the market structure,
that was not available in the free-entry equilibrium. Even if we take λ = 0,
the policy-maker will change the active number of firms, due to the simple
fact that the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient from the society’s point
of view. The (negative) effect of lobbying in the partial equilibrium should
then be the potential decrease in welfare registered as the number of firms
falls below the welfare maximizing level, and not the difference registered
relative to the status quo benchmark.
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Figure 13: The HU case. Lobbying generates an increase in per capita expenditures;
growth increases and welfare may also increase.
General equilibrium
The simple possibility of allowing a policy-maker to select the number of
firms induces a change in the market structure, which is consequently re-
flected in the general equilibrium through an increase in the value of per
capita expenditures. Hence, the true effect of lobbying over welfare is not
the change in welfare between the final allocation and the free-entry equilib-
rium, but instead the change in welfare between the final allocation and the
welfare maximizing allocation that a benevolent policy-maker would select.
Once this distinction is made, the analysis undertaken in the text can
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be immediately applied, with the exception that the welfare maximizing
allocation takes the role of the free-entry outcome. Hence, it follows that
lobbying can still improve welfare over a welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Since a benevolent policy-maker is always able to improve welfare over the
free-entry equilibrium, the final allocation with lobbying will almost surely
imply a greater level of welfare as compared to the free-entry equilibrium.
Such situation is depicted below.
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F. Rodŕıguez. Inequality, redistribution, and rent-seeking. Economics and Politics,
16(3):287–320, 2004.
W. Roeger. Can imperfect competition explain the difference between primal and
dual productivity measures? estimates for u.s. manufacturing. Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 103:316–330, 1995.
P. Romer. New goods, old theory and the welfare costs of trade restrictions. Journal
of Development Economics, 43(1):5–38, 1994.
D.A Schuler, K. Rehbein, and R.D. Cramer. Pursuing strategic advantage through
political means: A multivariate approach. Academy of Management Journal, 45:
659–673, 2002.
J. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper and Row, New York,
1942.
A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
108(3):599–617, 1993.
M. Spence. Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance. Econometrica,
52(1):101–121, 1984.
H. Strulik. Too much of a good thing? the quantitative economics of r&d-drivrn
growth revisited. Scand. J. of Economics, 109:369–386, 2007.
D.F. Taylor. The relationship between firm investments in technological innovation
and political action. Southern Economic Journal, 63:888–903, 1997.
J. Tirole. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT University
Press, 1988.
51
